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Margins of tradeThis paper analyzes the interaction between credit constraints and trading behavior, decomposing trade in
extensive and intensive margins. I construct a unique dataset containing ﬁrm-level trade transaction data,
balance sheets and credit scores from an independent credit insurance company for Belgian manufacturing
ﬁrms between 1999 and 2007. Firms are more likely to be exporting or importing if they enjoy lower credit
constraints. Also, ﬁrms that have better credit rating export and importmore. Importing and exporting behaviors
differ in how both the level and growth of the various margins of trade are related to credit constraints in one
important dimension. In the case of exports, it is the intensive and extensive margins of exports in terms of
both product and destinations that are signiﬁcantly associated with credit constraints whereas for imports it is
the extensive margin in terms of products only.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
When the economyenters a recession and a credit crunch shakes the
ﬁnancial sector, or simply when they suffer other types of shocks, ﬁrms
might ﬁnd it harder to access credit. This is likely to affect their
operations, the investments and R&D they conduct and the way they
develop and expand. There is however little empirical evidence on
how important ﬁnancial considerations are for the international
expansion and activities of ﬁrms and on how they adjust their trading
activities.
This paper considers the determinants of ﬁrm trading patterns by
matching ﬁrm-level trade transaction data with individual, time-
varying credit ratings. In particular, it seeks to analyze the interactions
between ﬁnancial or credit constraints on the one hand and exports
and imports margins on the other. While the analysis of ﬁrm-levelof the author and do not neces-
r any other institution to which
paper extends and supersedes
aints. A ﬁrm level approach”
Business School and Grantham
7594 9059.
. This is an open access article undertrade hasmostly focused on the relationship between trade andproduc-
tivity, this paper contributes to a recent literature studying another crit-
ical determinant of trading decisions: the ﬁnancial situation of the ﬁrm,
and in particular the credit constraints it faces. On the one hand, a bad
ﬁnancial situation might make its suppliers based abroad less willing
to risk trading with the ﬁrm, hence affecting its imports. On the other
hand, being credit-constrained would prevent the ﬁrm from overcom-
ing any ﬁxed costs associated with either exporting or importing.
Based on a unique and detailed dataset, I ﬁnd that ﬁrms that enjoy
lower credit constraints and bankruptcy risk are more likely to be
exporting. Firms that have better credit rating also export more. They
have higher extensive margins: they export more products to more
destinations. Their intensive margin, the average export value per ﬁrm-
product-country observation for all combinations with positive exports,
is higher too. The same patterns hold for imports except that the country
extensive margin and the import intensive margin, are not correlated
with credit constraints. Finally, most of these results are shown to hold
over time, when estimatedwith the growth of the various trademargins.
This brings novel insights on the differences between import and export
choices, and these correlations are useful to guide future theoreticalwork.
The detail of the datasets used is particularly suitable for the
questions addressed. First, the trade and balance sheet data cover the
full sample of Belgian manufacturing, at the ﬁrm level, with detailedthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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gins and products traded. This allows for a full decomposition of trade
ﬂows into the intensivemargin aswell as ﬁrm, country and product ex-
tensive margins and the density of trade. Using ﬁrm-level analysis in
this paper allows a better understanding of how ﬁrms vary within a
given sector. Second, the measure of credit constraints used is unique
in its kind: a yearlymeasure of the creditworthiness of ﬁrms established
by an institution external to the ﬁrm. By assessing ﬁnancial constraints
with a continuous credit rating rather than single and extreme default
payment episodes implies that the effects identiﬁed do not only hold
in the case of extreme credit constraints. The paper's main contribution
is to be using a measure of credit constraint that exhibits sufﬁcient
within-ﬁrm variation over time to relate it to the ﬁrms' importing and
exporting outcomes after controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.
This paper contributes to two related areas of the literature. First, the
relation between liquidity constraints and exports has been studied
both in theorymodels and empirically. The next sectionwill discuss rel-
evant theoretical papers. Empirically, the question has also been studied
using different datasets. Several papers use the sector-level Rajan and
Zingales (1998) measure of “external ﬁnance dependence” to examine
how it affects exports. Manova (2008) shows how ﬁnancial frictions
and credit market development explain cross-country patterns of
trade at the sector level. Export growth is proven to be slower in exter-
nal ﬁnance dependent sectors in Iacovone and Zavacka (2009). Consid-
ering Belgian exporters as in this paper, Behrens et al. (2013) ﬁnd that
imports fell more during the recent recession for ﬁrms with above me-
dian reliance on external ﬁnance. Analyzing transaction-level data and
the ﬁnancing terms used by ﬁrms, Antràs and Foley (2015) show how
trade ﬁnance, and hence ﬁnancial constraints, inﬂuence the impact of
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial crises. Analyzing monthly US imports
from countries with varying degrees of credit market tightness, Chor
and Manova (2012) demonstrate that exports are less sensitive to the
cost of external capital in industries relying less on external ﬁnance or
less ﬁnancially-vulnerable according to other measures, and that this
sensitivity rose during the ﬁnancial crisis.1 Albornoz et al. (2012)
analyze the sequential pattern of exports expansion by successful new
exporters for Argentina and ﬁnd that credit constraints do not explain
these patterns.2 The ﬁrm-level dimension of the dataset I use allows
me to go beyond this type of sectoral analysis and exploit intra-sector
variations. Others have used ﬁrm-level measures to capture credit
constraints. Minetti and Zhu (2011) analyze a cross-sectional survey
of Italian manufacturers and ﬁnd that “credit rationed” ﬁrms are less
likely to export and are likely to export less. They focus on the ﬁrm
extensive margin of exports. Berman and Héricourt (2010) ﬁnd similar
results for developing countries, using ﬁnancial ratios as measures of
constraints. They ﬁnd that ﬁnancial constraints are not correlated with
export values or export survival in those countries. Other authors also
explore these questions by deriving measures of ﬁnancial health and
constraints from balance sheet ﬁnancial ratios. Greenaway et al.
(2007)ﬁndnoex-ante effect on the probability of becoming an exporter
while Bellone et al. (2010) do. Askenazy et al. (2011) ﬁnd that credit
constraints negatively affect the entry into a new destination and in-
crease the probability of exiting a market.3 Exploiting data available
from the international ﬁrm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise
Surveys, Wang (2011) reports that the probability of exporting and1 An important literature has studied the impact of ﬁnancial crises on exports. The col-
lapse in trade relative to GDP during the 2008 crisis was larger than predicted by standard
econometric models. Ahn et al. (2011) describe how important ﬁnancial factors and trade
ﬁnance were to explain this episode. Other authors studying the crisis include Iacovone
and Zavacka (2009), Levchenko et al. (2010) and Paravisini et al. (2011). Amiti and
Weinstein (2011) study past ﬁnancial crises in Japan.
2 There are also several papers on ﬁnancial institutions and trade that show that export
volumes from ﬁnancially-vulnerable sectors are higher in ﬁnancially-developed countries
such as Beck (2002), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) and Hur et al. (2006).
3 Other authors using ﬁnancial ratios to study the correlations between exports and ﬁ-
nancial constraints include Campa and Shaver (2002) and Stiebale (2011).the export volume increase with age, which is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that ﬁrms need to accumulate sufﬁcient collateral before they
can borrow enough funds to proﬁtably export. This paper extends this
literature by analyzing the extensivemargins at the level of destinations
and products aswell as consideringﬁnancial constraints as a continuous
measure.
A second area of the trade literature has empirically analyzed ﬁrm-
level imports. The fact that the import of new varieties leads to higher
productivity and growth has been shown empirically both at the coun-
try level (Broda andWeinstein, 2006) and at theﬁrm level, with imports
of intermediates or reductions in input tariffs being associatedwith pro-
ductivity gains or higher productivity levels (see Antràs et al. (2014);
Amiti and Konings (2007); Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) or Goldberg
et al. (2010)). While my results do not contradict these ﬁndings, the
question I address is whether ﬁnancial constraints might prevent
some ﬁrms from reaping the beneﬁts of importing intermediates. Al-
though it may appear surprising that ﬁnancial constraints shape the
country-level extensive margin differently on the export side and on
the import side, these results are consistent with the ﬁndings of
Antràs et al. (2014). These authors show that the determination of the
country-level extensivemargin of importing is muchmore complicated
than inmodels of selection into exporting, mainly because themarginal
increase in proﬁts from adding a country to a ﬁrm's set of potential
sourcing locations depends on the number and characteristics of other
countries in the set. Imports and exports have often been compared in
the recent analysis of ﬁrm-level trade data. Descriptive evidence by
Bernard et al. (2007), Muûls and Pisu (2009) or Halpern et al. (2005)
shows that importing ﬁrms share many attributes with exporters:
they are both larger and more productive and product and country-
level patterns of trade at the ﬁrm level are similar for both. Based on a
theoretical model estimated with Chilean data, Kasahara and Lapham
(2013) analyze the complementarities of exports and imports for the
productivity and welfare gains of trade. This paper shows that imports
and exports are different in some important dimensions when put in
relation with credit constraints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the conceptual framework of how ﬁnancial constraints can
affect exporting and importing patterns. Section 3 describes the data,
and demonstrates in particular why the Coface score is an appropriate
measure of credit constraints. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis
of the links between export and import patterns and credit constraints
at a given point in time, while Section 5 takes a closer look at trade
growth. Section 6 concludes.
2. Conceptual framework
Why are credit constraints analyzed here speciﬁcally in relation to
trade transactions and not both domestic and international activities?
External ﬁnance is indeed used by ﬁrms to ﬁnance investments in
capital, product development and R&D or advertising among others.
However, in addition, trading ﬁrms face incremental ﬁxed and variable
expenses thus needing even more access to external capital. In order to
frame the empirical analysis below, one can decompose total trade
ﬂows.
At a ﬁrst level, total exports or imports of a country can be separated
between the total number of trading ﬁrms and the average values of
trade by these ﬁrms. In the following equationwhere Vj = x,m represents
total exports (x) or imports (m),
V j¼x;m ¼ f j  vj ð1Þ
fj is the ﬁrm extensive margin of exports or imports, reﬂecting the
number of ﬁrms having entered exporting or importing activities,
whereas vj stands for the overall intensive margin of trade, the average
exports or imports per ﬁrm. This is the type of margins decomposition
that arose ﬁrst in the literature, but with increasing availability of
5 More recently, Kohn et al. (2014) introduce ﬁnancial constraints into a standard trade
model in order to capture new exporter dynamics. The dynamic model of Caggese and
Cunat (2013) shows how the link between ﬁnancial constraints and exports can affect
the gains from trade liberalization. In Impullitti et al. (2013), the costs of exporting include
a sunk component which implies hysteresis in ﬁrm export participation. Arkolakis and
Muendler (2010) develop a theoretical model focussing on product level margins.
6 Given the difference of threshold for data to be available when a ﬁrm exports within
the EU and outside the EU (see Muûls and Pisu (2009)), we do not consider as exporters
or importers for a given year ﬁrms that trade only outside the EU and whose annual total
of imports and exports is lower than 250,000 Euros.
7 Note that in the BBSTTD, observations with a negative value-added or with less than
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Bernard et al. (2009). In this way, we have
vj¼x;m ¼
1
f j
Xf j
i¼1
vji ¼
1
f j
Xf j
i¼1
c ji p ji d ji u ji
h i
ð2Þ
with individual ﬁrms indexed as i. Two additional extensivemargins are
identiﬁed as the number of products (pji) exported ( j= x) or imported
( j=m) and the number of markets served or imported from (c ji). The
density term dji equals the ratio of the product of active (non-zero)
country and product combinations relative to the total number of possi-
ble country and product combinations (oji= c ji p ji
 
). The intensivemar-
gin uji would in such a case be the ﬁrm-country-product-level average
value per observation with positive trade (vji=oji). Each ﬁrm's exports
or imports can thus be decomposed as:
ln vji ¼ ln c ji þ ln pji þ ln dji þ ln uji ð3Þ
For exporters, sunk costs can be incurred in relation to both the coun-
try and product extensive margins. With regards to cxi , these could in-
clude, for example, making market-speciﬁc investments in production
capacity or developing a distribution network within new countries.4
As forpxi , ﬁxed costs could for instance be incurred tomake existing do-
mestic products compliant to international regulations. Some of these
costs might be borne for both products and destinations. The ﬁxed
costs to be incurred for exporting the ﬁrst product to the ﬁrst country
will also determine whether a ﬁrm is an exporter or not, and hence in-
ﬂuence the ﬁrm extensive margin of exports, fx. Variable trade costs
might also be incurred in relation touxi: a higher level of average exports
per active product-country would entail increased insurance, shipping
costs or customs, excise duties or other export taxes. Not only would
these costs be encountered before export revenues are realized, but in
comparison to domestic sales, international shipping and delivery
would increase this gap in time by up to 90 days (Djankov et al.,
2010). Firms are likely to rely on more external ﬁnancing to meet
these higher liquidity needs and will usually negotiate trade credit
from their suppliers or access trade ﬁnance from banks and other ﬁnan-
cial institutions. As will be described in Section 3.2 when describing the
credit score used in the empirical analysis, trade insurance is alsowidely
used by exporting ﬁrms.
What are the impacts of credit constraints on these different export
margins that are predicted by the existingmodels? Focussingmainly on
a framework with only a ﬁrm level extensive margin as in Eq. (1),
Chaney (2013) and Manova (2013) introduce credit constraints in a
theoretical model of trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms à la Melitz
(2003) and yield several predictions on the equilibrium relationships
between productivity, credit constraints, exports and export margins.
In bothmodels,ﬁrmsmust pay up-front aﬁxed cost of entry into foreign
markets and hence need sufﬁcient liquidity to do so. In Chaney's model,
ﬁrms ﬁnance these costs with cash ﬂows from their domestic opera-
tions. Once a ﬁrm has entered foreign markets, ﬁnancial constraints do
not impact the marginal cost of exporting: the ﬁrm will ﬁnance an
increase in the scale of its exports through its internal cash-ﬂow and
foreign trade credit. In equilibrium, ﬁnancial constraints impact the
extensive but not the intensive margin of exports. In Manova (2013),
ﬁrms need to borrow to cover both the ﬁxed and the variable costs of
exporting. This follows from the imperfect enforceability of internation-
al transaction contracts together with imperfect information on the po-
tential returns from foreign markets. In equilibrium, total exports will
increase with lower credit constraints. More productive ﬁrms and less
credit-constrained ﬁrmswill bemore likely to export. Credit constraints
will decrease the ﬁrm extensive margin and the overall intensive4 Moxnes (2010) shows that ﬁxed costs of exporting are to some extentmarket speciﬁc.margin vt (average exports per ﬁrm). To summarize, thesemodels illus-
trate that in equilibrium, credit constraints affect the intensive (respec-
tively, extensive)margins of exports ifﬁnancial constraints are assumed
to affect the variable (respectively, ﬁxed) costs of exporting.
There is to the best of my knowledge no model that explicitly con-
siders ﬁrm exporting decisions in relation to credit constraints with a
distinction of exportmargins according to Eqs. (2) and (3).5 In a stylized
dynamic model, Besedeš et al. (2014) focus on changes in the intensive
margin and show that credit constraints can have an important role in
the start of exporting activity, but not on the growth of exports in
later stages. There is also limited empirical ﬁrm-level evidence on
these issues, with existing studies focussing on export margins as de-
ﬁned by Eq. (1), or considering whether or not the ﬁrm exports to
more than one market as in Minetti and Zhu (2011). By illustrating
the correlations between these constraints on the one side and the dif-
ferent extensive margins and the intensive margin of exports on the
other, the results of the empirical analysis below should serve as a mo-
tivation for future theoretical work in this area.
For importers, it is also true that ﬁrms face ﬁxed costs in regards to
both the country and product extensive margins. Relating to cmi , the
country extensivemargin, there could be a cost toﬁnding a suitable sup-
plier in a new country. Similarly, shifting the sourcing of an additional
input fromhome to abroad, the product extensivemarginpmi, would in-
volve for example ﬁxed expenditures to verify regulation and techno-
logical issues. As in the case of exports, the combination of these sunk
costs would also determine the ﬁrm extensive margin, fm. Variable
costs affecting umi could include delivery expenses, duties or insurance.
Hopefully, the empirical analysis that follows in this paperwill guide the
development of theoretical frameworks to analyze the relations
between import margins and credit constraints.3. Data
3.1. The Belgian balance sheet and trade transaction data
This dataset provided by theNational Bank of Belgiumhas beenused
in several papers analyzing export and import patterns and behavior
(see Muûls and Pisu (2009); Behrens et al. (2013) and Araujo et al.
(2012) among others). It merges ﬁrm-level balance sheet and trade
data for Belgium. The balance sheet part of the BBSTTD is used to extract
ﬁrm-level annual characteristics, including employment, value added,
proﬁtability, sector of activity and to compute total factor productivity.
The trade data includes the value, destinations and origins as well as
products at the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (or CN8) level of the
EU.6
Manufacturing ﬁrms only are selected as belonging to sectors 15 to
36 of the NACE-BEL classiﬁcation.7 The data is then merged into the
Coface database, described in the following subsection. Only ﬁrms for
which a Coface score is given for each year a balance sheet was available
are included in the dataset. All observations are kept in the resulting
dataset, which is described in Table 3.one employee are dropped. Also, ﬁrms from sector 232 (reﬁned petroleum products)
are excluded as their total factor productivity (TFP) measures are strong outliers.
Fig. 1. Credit insurance.
8 Also, only 200 ﬁrms out of more than 13,000 manufacturing ﬁrms present in the
BBSTD are not included in theCoface sample. Given these aremostly very smallﬁrms, con-
trolling for these variables will avoid potential selection bias.
9 Although the score is updated by Coface on a continuous basis, the data provided by
the company for this paper only reports the score of each ﬁrm on December 31st.
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3.2.1. The Coface score
As a measure of credit constraints, I use the Coface Services Belgium
Global Score for more than 9000 Belgian manufacturing ﬁrms between
1999 and 2007. Credit insurance ﬁrms offer insurance policies to busi-
nesses that wish to protect their accounts receivable from loss due to
commercial and political credit risks such as protracted default, overdue
accounts, insolvency or bankruptcy. Established in France in 1945 as a
credit insurance company, Coface is now an international ﬁrm, provid-
ing a range of services to facilitate business-to-business trade. Among
these, it also provides credit worthiness information: through a world-
wide network of credit information entities, it has constructed an inter-
national buyer's risk database on 44 million companies. Data from
public and private sources are added to Coface's internal data in order
to manage each company's rating and Coface's risk exposure on a con-
tinuous basis. Fig. 1 provides an example of who the parties would be
in a credit insurance contract. Belgian ﬁrm A is a client of Coface. It
wants to sell a product to Belgian ﬁrm B and protects itself against the
risk that B might default on paying for that product. As it would do for
any transaction, it asks Coface whether it will be covered. Coface, if it
hasn't already done so, will compute a score for B, and if it is high
enough will insure the transaction. A will send the product to B in ex-
change for payment. If B defaults, Coface will pay A and seek to recover
the amount from B. Imagine that Belgian ﬁrm B also exports goods to
ﬁrm C and imports inputs from ﬁrm D. Neither B, C nor D are clients
of Coface, but because of its transaction with ﬁrm A, the credit rating
score of ﬁrm B will be in the dataset.
There is a large academic literature on bankruptcy predictionmodels
such as that used to construct Coface's score (see for example the review
by Balcaen and Ooghe (2006)). However, privately-computed probabil-
ity of default or credit scores such as Coface's are naturally less well-
known. Various datasets are compiled to construct the Coface score:
the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial statements (leverage, liquidity, proﬁtability, size,
etc.), its legal form, age and life cycle, location and information on its
commercial premises as well as industry speciﬁc information. Data on
payment incidents both with other ﬁrms and to the social security
(ONSS) are also used. Finally, legal judgments and the board structure
are taken into account. For example, if a ﬁrm goes bankrupt it will neg-
atively affect the score of all companies that have common boardmembers. These various inputs are combined using several statistical
methods and trial-and-error. The result is a score ranging from 3/20 to
19/20. Although themodel predicts continuous scores they are rounded
to unity in the obtained data. The score therefore contains information
about the ﬁrm's quality, performance and productivity. However, two
ﬁrmswith equally valuable projects, and identical proﬁtability and pro-
ductivity can be very different in terms of ﬁnancial health, board struc-
ture, and other elements thatwill determine their score and their access
to credit. The empirical analysis will therefore control for a number of
variables that could potentially inﬂuence both the Coface score and
the trading activity, such as size, proﬁtability and productivity of
ﬁrms.8 Aﬁrm's score varies fromyear to year: the average yearly change
is 2 points (or 12.5% of the largest possible variation from3/20 to 19/20)
with a standard deviation of 2. The average difference between a ﬁrm's
largest score over the time sample and its lowest is 6 points. It is this
variation that I exploit in my analysis below.
Importantly for the purpose of this paper, Coface's score does not in-
clude in its determination model any information on the ﬁrm's exports
or imports. Firm-level trade data is not public information in Belgium
and even if Coface would have such information for some ﬁrms through
it's network of international clients, it does not enter directly in the
computation of the score. However, trade performance might affect
the score indirectly, through its impact on proﬁtability for example or
other variables that are included in the construction of the score.
While it does not remove all potential endogeneity in the Coface
score, great care is taken in the remainder of the paper to include crucial
ﬁrm-level controls and to exploit the panel dimension of the data. Con-
structed as a bankruptcy risk measure, the score is highly correlated
with how credit-constrained a ﬁrm is, reﬂecting the same type of infor-
mation that a bankwould use to decidewhether it lends to a ﬁrm. Being
determined independently by a private ﬁrm, it is unusual for such data
to be available and has a great advantage on measures of credit con-
straints used in the literature so far: it is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, varies through
time on a yearly basis9 and allows for a continuous measure of the
Table 1
The correlation between the score and ﬁnancial ratios and productivity.
Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial independence 4.970***
(0.080)
Borrowings coverage 0.448***
(0.029)
EBITDA (Ln) 0.0717**
(0.027)
Investment ratio 0.530***
(0.028)
Productivity 0.0650**
(0.023)
Employment 0.529***
(0.024)
0.468***
(0.026)
0.422***
(0.028)
0.554***
(0.025)
0.465***
(0.026)
Observations 129,541 129,515 129,542 130,848 129,471
Number of ﬁrms 19,932 20,030 19,968 20,091 19,868
R-squared 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Firm ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed-effect OLS regression (“Within” estimator). The dataset is an unbalanced
panel of Belgianmanufacturing ﬁrms from the BBSTTDwith Coface score available and in-
cludes an average of 14,698 ﬁrms per year in 100 three-digit sectors over the period 1999
to 2007. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%
level; ** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level; *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% level. Includes constant and year dummies, not reported. The ratios are deﬁned as
follows: Financial independence= Equity capital/Total liabilities; Coverage of borrowings
by cash ﬂow=Cash ﬂow/(Debt + Reserves+ Deferred tax); EBITDA (Ln)= ln [Earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization]; Investment ratio= Acquisitions of
tangible ﬁxed assets/Value added. The extreme observations (top and bottom percentile)
for each ratio across all years are removed for the corresponding regression. Total Factor
Productivity is measured according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method. Employ-
ment is in logarithm. The dependent variable is the credit rating score constructed for
each year and each ﬁrm by Coface and ranges from 3 to 19. The variation in the number
of observations is due to ﬁrms not reporting some of the variables used in the calculation
of a given ratio in their balance sheet.
Table 2
Score of ﬁnancially-constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms according to dividend payout
ratio and total assets.
Score Mean SE Max Min N
Dividend payout
Constrained 13.31 0.05 19 3 3808
Unconstrained 13.92 0.04 19 3 3808
Total assets
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constrained or unconstrained categories. Compared to datasets on
payment incidents that would identify a small subset of ﬁrms as being
credit-constrained,10 the Coface score ranks ﬁrms along the whole
spectrum of ratings. Payment incidents would only be one of the
elements affecting the score, in combination with many others.
Overall, the Coface score is a well-suited direct measure of credit-
worthiness used by other ﬁrms and by banks when extending loans,
and I therefore use it in my empirical analysis to measure how credit-
constrained ﬁrms are.
3.2.2. External validation
This section presents the correlation between the score and ﬁrm
fundamentals. It also relates it to the important literature on credit con-
straints, in particular in corporate ﬁnance.
Given the methodology used to construct the score is not available
publicly, it is shown here how correlated the score is with the ﬁrm's
ﬁnancial situation and productivity. A selection of ﬁnancial ratios11
measures each ﬁrm's solvency and investment.
Table 1 shows how strongly the Coface score is correlated with the
ﬁnancial situation of the company, in particular its solvency and invest-
ment intensity. Firm and year ﬁxed effects are included in the OLS re-
gression, thus also controlling for possible differences in, for example,
risk premie across industries and years which might affect the Coface
score and other ﬁnancial measures differentially. Solvency is measured
with two ratios: ﬁnancial independence and coverage of borrowings by
cash ﬂow. The strong correlation between these and the score shows
that ﬁrms that are more able to meet their short- and long-term
ﬁnancial liabilities have a higher score. Financial independence, the
ratio between equity capital and total liabilities, reﬂects how indepen-
dent the ﬁrm is of borrowings. The coverage of borrowings by cash
ﬂow measures the ﬁrm's repayment capability, and its converse spec-
iﬁes the number of years it would take to repay its debts assuming
that its cash ﬂow was constant. Higher scores are also associated with
larger investment ratios, the acquisitions of tangible ﬁxed assets over
value added.
EBITDA (Earnings before Interests, Taxes, Depreciation and Amorti-
zation) is a commonly used ﬁnancial measure of the operational proﬁt-
ability and performance of the ﬁrm. It appears as being positively
associated with the Coface score. I will include it as a control in the
regression analysis below, in order to control for the effects of the
proﬁtability of a company. Productivity has been shown to be an impor-
tant determinant of trade patterns. It is measured here as in Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003).12
Column (5) of Table 1 reports a positive but not perfect correlation of
the Coface score with productivity, conﬁrming that credit constraints
and productivity are two different issues to be consideredwhen analyz-
ing export behavior.
The effects of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrmbehavior are an important
area of research in corporate ﬁnance. Compared with the existing liter-
ature, the Coface score provides many advantages, as described above.
One of the many approaches in the literature consists of sorting ﬁrms
into ﬁnancially-constrained and unconstrained types on a yearly basis
by ranking ﬁrms according to different measures. In Almeida et al.
(2004), ﬁrms in the top three deciles of their payout dividend ratio
would be considered as less ﬁnancially-constrained than ﬁrms in the
bottom three. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) use total assets. I test10 Bricongne et al. (2012) report that 4.7% of French exporters experienced a payment in-
cident between January and April 2007.
11 For examples of ratio computations using Belgian balance sheet formats, see Lagneaux
and Vivet (2006).
12 TFP is computed in this approach by using materials as a proxy rather than invest-
ment, thus reducing the number of zero-observations often noted in the data for invest-
ment compared to materials. The results presented below are robust to using alternative
measures of Total Factor Productivity or the logarithm of labour productivity measured
by value added per employee, rather than TFP.in Table 2 whether the score is consistent with such classiﬁcations.
The mean Coface score, its standard error, maximum andminimum ob-
servations are reported separately for constrained and unconstrained
ﬁrms. Firms whose dividend payout is in the top 30 percentiles are
considered as ﬁnancially unconstrained, whereas those in the bottom
30 percentiles are ﬁnancially constrained. The same is done with total
assets. The mean test is passed, meaning that constrained ﬁrms have a
lower score than unconstrained ﬁrms, in both criteria. It is robust to
using only one cross-section of the data, or taking out observations
within the top and bottom percentiles of each measure. This conﬁrms
that the Coface score offers a creditworthinessmeasure that is consistent
with other measures used in the literature.Constrained 9.88 0.02 19 3 29,687
Unconstrained 12.59 0.02 19 3 29,687
Notes: See notes to Table 1. The mean Coface score, its standard error, maximum and
minimum observations are reported for the different categories deﬁned. Firms whose
dividend payout is in the top 30 percentiles are considered as ﬁnancially unconstrained,
whereas those in the bottom 30 percentiles are ﬁnancially constrained. The same is
done with total assets. The mean test is passed, meaning that constrained ﬁrms have a
lower score than unconstrained ﬁrms, in both criteria. This is robust to using only one
cross-section of the data, or taking out observationswithin the top and bottom percentiles
of each measure.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Non-traders Exporters Importers
Mean sd Obs. se Mean sd Obs. se Mean sd Obs. se
Score 10.6 3.77 81,832 0.01 12.4 3.80 36,956 0.02 12.5 3.74 39,940 0.02
Employment 7.95 18.90 81,832 0.07 103.3 332.13 36,956 1.7 99.2 320.73 39,940 1.6
Productivity 10.2 1.11 79,890 0.004 11.0 1.63 36,770 0.009 11.0 1.63 39,745 0.008
Operational proﬁtability 450.9 1276.33 81,832 4.5 8567.8 41,484.97 36,956 215.8 8248.7 40,213.06 39,940 201.2
Wage 31.0 24.49 81,832 0.09 39.8 18.58 36,956 0.10 39.7 15.62 39,940 0.08
Age 15.6 12.05 81,827 0.04 23.5 16.73 36,954 0.09 23.5 16.58 39,938 0.08
Multinational 0.0026 0.05 81,832 0.0002 0.087 0.28 36,956 0.001 0.082 0.28 39,940 0.001
Investment ratio 0.24 0.40 81,829 0.001 0.18 0.27 36,949 0.001 0.18 0.28 39,933 0.001
Borrowings coverage ratio 0.38 0.42 81,831 0.001 0.37 0.40 36,956 0.002 0.37 0.41 39,940 0.002
Financial independence 0.32 0.28 81,831 0.0010 0.34 0.24 36,956 0.001 0.35 0.24 39,940 0.001
Number of countries 13.7 16.97 36,956 7.61 5.89 39,940
Number of products 14.5 23.93 36,956 39.2 55.20 39,940
Total export/import value 19.2 113.31 36,956 10.5 68.37 39,940
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgianmanufacturing ﬁrms from the BBSTTDwith Coface score available and includes an average of 14,686 ﬁrms per year in 100 three-digit
sectors over the period 1999 to 2007. Observations are at the ﬁrm-year level. The credit rating score constructed for each year and each ﬁrm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. The multina-
tional dummy (0/1) is derived from the Survey on Foreign Direct Investment. Productivity is measured as Total Factor Productivity according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method.
Operational proﬁtability is measured by EBITDA and is reported in thousand of Euros. Wage is reported in thousand Euros. Total export value is reported in million Euros. See Table 1
for the deﬁnition of the ratios. The means, standard deviations, numbers of observations and standard errors of means are reported. Exporters/Importers are ﬁrms that were
exporting/importing a positive amount in that year. Non-traders were trading zero in that year.
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4.1. Export or import status
I begin the empirical analysis by exploring the variation in credit
scores between exporters and importers on the one hand and non-
traders on the other. It appears that less credit-constrained ﬁrms
are more likely to be trading. This is shown at ﬁrst in the descriptive
statistics presented in Table 3: on average, traders are not only signiﬁ-
cantly larger and more productive, they also have a signiﬁcantly higher
score, meaning they are more creditworthy and less liquidity-
constrained.
This is conﬁrmed when estimating the effects of different ﬁrm
characteristics on the probability of exporting or importing in a given
year with the following two separate speciﬁcations for importers or
exporters:
Ex=Importer 0=1ð Þi;t ¼ α þ β1CSi;t−1
þ
X
j¼2
β jFirmChar jð Þi;t−1 þ FEf g þ εi;t ð4Þ
Where Ex/Importer(0/1)i,t is a dummy that takes the value 1 if ﬁrm i
is an exporter/importer at time t and zero otherwise. CSi,t − 1 is the
Coface credit score13 for ﬁrm i at time t− 1 and additional ﬁrm charac-
teristics are added: productivity, operational proﬁtability, wage, age,
employment, MNE status and ﬁnancial ratios proxying ﬁrm access to ﬁ-
nance. Of course, many other factors might affect a ﬁrm's export status
such as the current economic situation, and other characteristics of
the ﬁrm. Other potential factors such as exchange rates, factor endow-
ments, factor prices or industry demandwill be common to all exporters
of a sector in a given year. This is why I include ﬁrm and sector-year
ﬁxed effects in my speciﬁcations, denoted by {FE}, thus eliminating
any bias that they could cause. The results are also presentedwith an al-
ternative set of ﬁxed effects – year and sector – for comparability with
the previous literature. Each ﬁrm only belongs to one sector so in the
speciﬁcation where ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are not included, sector ﬁxed ef-
fects are used to control for non-time-varying sector-speciﬁc idiosyn-
crasies. Including ﬁxed effects, controlling for ﬁrm-level observables
and given the composition of the score described above, the residual13 As a robustness check, available from the author at request, the square of the scorewas
included as explanatory variable. The results remain qualitatively similar.effect of the Coface score is a good measure of credit constraints faced
by a ﬁrm.
Given the number of ﬁxed effects to be included in the speciﬁcation,
using a linear probability model in levels addresses the incidental
parameter problem that affects non-linear ﬁxed effect estimates. This
speciﬁcation is used in Bernard and Jensen (2004) for a very similar bi-
nary choice problem despite the problems this might provoke (e.g. pre-
dicted probabilities outside the 0–1 range). The ﬁrst four columns of
Table 4 only include sector and year ﬁxed effects, as in Bernard and
Jensen (2004). In columns (5) and (6), the full set of sector-year and
ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are included. Finally, as a robustness check, the results
using a conditional logit estimator with year and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are
presented in column (7). Other ﬁrm characteristics are also included
as controls in columns (3) to (7): operational proﬁtability, wage levels,
age of theﬁrm,multinational status and the ﬁnancial ratios presented in
Table (1). As would be expected, the Table shows that more productive
ﬁrms are more likely to export, although the coefﬁcient becomes insig-
niﬁcant once ﬁrm and sector-year ﬁxed effects are included. The coefﬁ-
cient on the lagged credit score is positive and signiﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations, conﬁrming that ﬁrms which are less credit-constrained
have a higher probability of being exporters. In column (2), the coefﬁ-
cient on productivity is not reduced compared to the ﬁrst column, indi-
cating that the score captures the additional effect of credit constraints.
Column (3) shows that the effect of productivity decreases while that of
the credit score increases when more controls are added. When includ-
ing the lagged export status variable, as in Bernard and Jensen (2004),
the coefﬁcients on TFP and the Coface score are strongly reduced as
shown in column (4). Columns (6) and (7) show that the sign and
signiﬁcance of the score coefﬁcient remain robust to including ﬁrm as
well as sector-year ﬁxed effects. Conditional logit with ﬁrm and year
ﬁxed effects yields similar results although the signiﬁcance of the
coefﬁcient on the Coface score is lower, as shown in Column (7).
These results are consistent with the literature showing that the ﬁrm
extensive margin of exports (fm in Eq. (1)) is positively correlated
with lower credit constraints.
Very similar results are obtained when estimating the effect of the
Coface score on import status using exactly the same speciﬁcations. As
shown in Table 5, one notable difference with export status is that the
positive effect of productivity on the probability of being an importer
remains strong and signiﬁcant across the different speciﬁcations. Less
ﬁnancially-constrained ﬁrms have a higher probability of being im-
porters. Also, the strongly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the Coface score is
robust to including sector-year and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects as well as the
14 This is calculated using the coefﬁcient in column (1) in combinationwith the standard
deviation of the logarithm of the score (0.414): exp(0.414*0.104)-1 = 4.39%.
Table 4
Linear probability model on exporter status.
Dependent variable: 0/1 Dummy non-exporter/exporter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LIN PROB LIN PROB LIN PROB LIN PROB LIN PROB LIN PROB COND LOG
Score 0.027*** 0.048*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.156*
ln(Score (t-1)) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.080)
Productivity 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.026*** 0.006*** 0.006 0.004 0.238**
ln(TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.097)
Operational proﬁtability 0.115*** 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.643***
ln(EBITDA (t-1)) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.100)
Wage −0.016*** −0.008*** −0.008* −0.007* −0.033
ln(Wage (t-1)) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.111)
Age 0.009*** −0.007*** 0.024*** 0.012*** 0.327**
ln(Age) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.141)
Foreign 0.001 0.002 0.003 −0.000 0.471
Dummy for MNE(t-1) (0.006) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.424)
Existing exporter 0.800*** 0.247*** 0.915***
Exporter/non-exporter (t-1) (0.003) (0.009) (0.044)
Employment 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.038*** 0.006*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.856***
ln(Employment (t-1)) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.097)
Investment ratio 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 −0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Borrowings coverage ratio −0.025*** −0.004* −0.003 −0.002 −0.052
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.056)
Financial independence ratio −0.052*** −0.017*** −0.011 −0.009 −0.371**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.173)
Observations 107,994 107,994 103,516 103,516 103,516 103,516 17,304
Number of ﬁrms 18,740 18,740 2512
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.80 0.86 0.87
Firm ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Sector-Year ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses; Stars denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. Includes constant and 3-digit sector and year
dummies or sector-year dummies, not reported. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm exports or not in that year. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has
been lagged by one year. Ln (x) is the natural logarithm of variable x. The Foreign dummy variable takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm is part of amultinational, 0 otherwise. It is obtained from the
Survey on Foreign Direct Investment conducted by the National Bank of Belgium.
339M. Muûls / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 333–343lagged importer status in the linear probability model as shown in
column (6) or the conditional logit speciﬁcation in column (7). The
coefﬁcient of the credit constraint score is larger than in the case of ex-
ports. Import and export status, and hence the ﬁrm extensive margins
for both trade ﬂows, are therefore correlated to credit worthiness in a
very similar way. These ﬁrst results show that there are factors of credit
worthiness that the Coface score integrates, over and above the ob-
served balance sheet ﬁrm-level variables that are included as controls
and to which the score is correlated. The regressions here and in the
next sections are highlighting the effects of these additional elements
of credit worthiness.
4.2. Value, destinations, origins and products
Conditional on being a trader, it is also of interest to understand how
credit constraints might be related to the total value of exports or im-
ports. Also, how might the number of countries being served or
imported from and the number of products being traded be related to
credit constraints? In other words, how strong is the association be-
tween credit constraints and each of the margins identiﬁed in Eq. (3)?
This is explored by specifying for each of the margins:
ln yð Þi;t ¼ α þ β1CSi;t−1 þ
X
j¼2
β jFirmChar jð Þi;t−1 þ δi þ δst þ εi;t ð5Þ
where y is either the total exports or imports value per ﬁrm (vji ), the
number of destinations (cxi ), the number of origins (cmi ), the number
of products (pji), the density (dji) or the average exports/imports per ob-
servation with positive trade (uji). δi and δst are respectively ﬁrm and
sector-year ﬁxed effects. In contrast to Tables 4 and 5 where differentcombinations of ﬁxed effects are presented, I here include sector-year
and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects in all cases. I also control for ﬁrm characteristics:
EBITDA, wages, age, MNE status, employment and three ﬁnancial ratios
presented above, as proxies of a company's access to ﬁnance: the invest-
ment ratio, the borrowing coverage ratio and the ﬁnancial indepen-
dence ratio. The result of such an OLS regression for each dependent
variable is reported in Table 6, where it appears that in the case of ex-
ports the lagged score is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with
total exports. This supports the result ofManova'smodel inwhich credit
constraints would reduce ﬁrm-level exports. In addition, I ﬁnd that the
score is positively associated with each of the ﬁrm-level extensive mar-
gins as well as the intensive margin. It is negatively associated with the
density. The evidence in Table 6 thus suggests that credit constraints are
positively correlatedwith both theﬁxed costs of exporting– reﬂected in
the extensive margins – and the variable costs that affect the intensive
margin. It also suggests that the Coface score has explanatory power
for export patterns beyond other measures of a company's access to
external ﬁnance that are the ﬁnancial ratios included as controls.
In order to obtain a sense of the magnitude of these effects, one can
compute that a one standard deviation increase in the log of the credit
score corresponds to a 4.4%14 increase in total exports. This can be com-
pared to the average annual increase in total Belgian exports between
1995 and 2008 which was 5.4% (Baugnet et al., 2010). Comparing the
different margins, a 10% increase in the score (and not the logarithm
of the score) would correspond to a 0.4% increase of both the number
of products exported and destinations served and a 0.45% increase of
the intensive margin. This is a small ﬁgure in the case of products
given that the mean annual increase in the number of products
Table 5
Linear probability model on importer status.
Dependent variable: 0/1 Dummy non-importer/importer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LIN PROB LIN PROB LIN PROB LIN PROB LIN PROB LIN PROB COND LOG
Score 0.040*** 0.061*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.474***
ln(Score (t-1)) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.083)
Productivity 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.025*** 0.010*** 0.010** 0.011** 0.398***
ln(TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.104)
Operational proﬁtability 0.129*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.495***
ln(EBITDA (t-1)) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.103)
Wage −0.017*** −0.010*** −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.204*
ln(Wage (t-1)) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.114)
Age 0.010*** −0.007*** 0.019*** 0.008* 0.699***
ln(Age) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.150)
Foreign −0.053*** −0.013*** 0.000 0.000 0.897
Dummy for MNE(t-1) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.606)
Existing importer 0.809*** 0.236*** 0.934***
Importer/non-imp. (t-1) (0.003) (0.009) (0.043)
Employment 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.035*** 0.007*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.890***
ln(Employment (t-1)) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.099)
Investment ratio 0.000* 0.000* −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Borrowings coverage −0.029*** −0.006*** −0.004* −0.003 −0.066
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.062)
Financial independence −0.044*** −0.018*** −0.019*** −0.018*** −0.770***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.200)
Observations 107,994 107,994 103,516 103,516 103,516 103,516 16,049
Number of ﬁrms 18,352 18,352 2341
R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.81 0.88 0.88
Firm ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Sector-year ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes No
Notes: See notes to Tables 1 and 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses; Stars denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. Includes constant and 3-digit sector
and year dummies or sector-year dummies, not reported. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm imports or not in that year. (t-1) indicates the explanatory var-
iable has been lagged by one year. Ln (x) is the natural logarithm of variable x.
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sult for countries given that on average ﬁrms do not increase the num-
ber of countries they export to.
In the case of imports, the lagged score is positively and signiﬁcantly
associated with total imports as well as the number of products
imported, the product extensive margin. But in contrast with the corre-
sponding result for exports, the coefﬁcient on the number of origins is
insigniﬁcant. A potential explanation behind this result is that ﬁrms
rarely source goods frommultiple countries. Themean number of coun-
tries fromwhich a ﬁrm imports a given product, whether deﬁned at the
8-digit or 6-digit level, is 1.5, while it is 3.68 countries per exported CN8
product. This has also been found using U.S. data in Antràs et al. (2014)
and it could be due to the ﬁxed cost of expanding on the product exten-
sivemargin of imports being smaller than theﬁxed cost of expandingon
the country extensive margin. The fact that the country-level extensive
margin of imports is not signiﬁcantly shaped by the credit score is also
consistent with the model in Antràs et al. (2014). Another channel to
take into account is that if a ﬁrm does not have a good ﬁnancial health,
foreign ﬁrms will be less willing to risk a payment default, limiting the
range of inputs it can import from abroad. There appears to be no rela-
tionship between the import intensive margin and credit constraints,
which would indicate that variable costs for imports are less related to
the access to external ﬁnance. One standard deviation increase in the
logarithm of the score would correspond to a 3.4% increase in total
imports, suggesting that access to credit matters less than in the case
of exports on aggregate, although the coefﬁcient for the product exten-
sivemargin is slightly higher than for exports. These various results will
be analyzed in their growth dimension in Section 5.
It is also interesting to note that for exports, only total value and the
intensive margin are positively related to productivity while for
imports, it is also the case of the number of origins. A higher EBITDA ispositively associated with all margins for both imports and exports.
This suggests that ﬁrms that reach a certain maturity make bigger mar-
gins on their products thus obtaining higher proﬁtability and exports. A
higher EBITDA might also reﬂect lower input costs which could be the
result of a more intense importing behavior. The negative and signiﬁ-
cant coefﬁcients for the ﬁnancial independence ratio that appear in
most speciﬁcations of Tables 6 and 7 could be due to the fact that a
higher ratio at t− 1 will facilitate the ﬁrm's potential to increase its lia-
bilities which in itself will decrease the ratio at t. This decrease has a
negative impact on trade values and its margins. Finally, the strongly
signiﬁcant and large coefﬁcient for the employment variable in the
case of the extensive margins conﬁrms that it is important to control
for ﬁrm size when considering the trading decisions of ﬁrms.
These results clearly establish the relationship that exists between
credit constraints and exporting and importing patterns, even if once
productivity, size, proﬁtability, access to ﬁnance and other ﬁrm charac-
teristics are controlled for.5. The effects of credit constraints over time
This section shows how credit constraints relate to changes in
trade levels and their margins. Policy makers are usually keen to un-
derstand the determinants of trade growth. Given the openness of
the Belgian economy and its size, the number of ﬁrms starting to ex-
port within the sample is too low to lead to meaningful results. I
therefore focus on understanding the impact of credit constraints
on the growth in total imports and exports, decomposing them
through the product and country extensive margins as well as the
densities and intensive margins of exporters and importers through
time. Deﬁning Δvj;ti ¼ vj;ti=vj;t−1i as the change in the total value of
Table 6
Total exports, destinations and products.
Exports Imports
Dependent
variable:
Total value Destinations Products Density Av. value Total value Origins Products Density Av. value
ln (Total
exports
value)
ln (Number
of dest.)
ln (Number
of products)
ln(active prod.-dest.
per total potential)
ln(Av. Value
per active
prod.-dest.)
ln (Total
imports
value)
ln (Number
of origins)
ln (Number
of products)
ln(active
prod.-orig. per
total potential)
ln(Av. Value
per active
prod.-orig.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Score 0.104*** 0.039*** 0.040** −0.020** 0.045** 0.080*** 0.016 0.047*** −0.009 0.026
ln(Score (t-1)) (0.031) (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.027) (0.012) (0.017) (0.009) (0.018)
Productivity 0.143*** 0.017 −0.002 0.011 0.117*** 0.098*** 0.018* 0.023 −0.018** 0.075***
ln(TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) (0.034) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.023) (0.027) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.019)
Operational prof. 0.173*** 0.050*** 0.066*** −0.038*** 0.095*** 0.203*** 0.052*** 0.098*** −0.047*** 0.099***
ln(EBITDA (t-1)) (0.036) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.024) (0.036) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010) (0.025)
Wage −0.108** −0.003 0.020 −0.007 −0.118*** −0.100* 0.011 −0.017 −0.005 −0.090**
ln(Wage (t-1)) (0.052) (0.022) (0.030) (0.017) (0.034) (0.051) (0.021) (0.029) (0.016) (0.035)
Age −0.005 0.053 −0.019 −0.025 −0.014 0.013 −0.014 −0.040 0.025 0.042
ln(Age) (0.076) (0.036) (0.041) (0.025) (0.049) (0.073) (0.030) (0.046) (0.024) (0.047)
Foreign 0.182** 0.092*** 0.120*** −0.076*** 0.047 0.032 0.018 0.027 −0.012 −0.001
0–1 dummy (0.073) (0.031) (0.036) (0.020) (0.043) (0.048) (0.016) (0.027) (0.014) (0.038)
Employment 0.418*** 0.208*** 0.258*** −0.169*** 0.122*** 0.410*** 0.206*** 0.315*** −0.179*** 0.068**
ln(Employment
(t-1))
(0.049) (0.021) (0.029) (0.016) (0.032) (0.052) (0.022) (0.032) (0.017) (0.033)
Investment ratio 0.004 0.003** 0.005 −0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Borrowings cov. 0.007 −0.003 −0.015 0.002 0.022 0.019 0.007 −0.009 −0.001 0.022
(0.026) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017)
Financial independ. −0.328*** −0.097** −0.204*** 0.121*** −0.148** −0.319*** −0.081** −0.091* 0.047* −0.194***
(0.099) (0.040) (0.047) (0.028) (0.067) (0.077) (0.033) (0.048) (0.027) (0.056)
Observations 31,344 31,344 31,344 31,344 31,344 27,392 27,392 27,392 27,392 27,392
Number of ﬁrms 6239 6239 6239 6239 6239 5552 5552 5552 5552 5552
R-squared 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.91 0.88 0.91 0.87 0.88
Firm ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See notes to Table 4. Fixed-effect (“Within”) regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses; Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. Includes
constant and sector-year dummies, not reported.
The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing ﬁrms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available or each year they ﬁle in a balance sheet over the period and includes an
average of 14,686 ﬁrms per year in 100 three-digit sectors over the period 1999 to 2007.
Ln (x) is the natural logarithmof variable x. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year. The credit rating score, constructed for each year and each ﬁrm by Coface
ranges from3 to 19. TFP Lev-Pet is ameasureof Total Factor Productivity calculated according to LevinsohnandPetrin's (2003)method. The Foreign dummyvariable takes the value 1 if the
ﬁrm is part of a multinational, 0 otherwise. It is obtained from the Survey on Foreign Direct Investment conducted by the National Bank of Belgium.
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ﬁrst difference operator to Eq. (3), it can be decomposed as:
Δvj;ti ¼ Δ ln c jti
 
þ Δ ln pjti
 
þ Δ ln djti
 
þ Δ ln ujti
 
ð6Þ
where Δ lnc jti
 
reﬂects the change in the country extensive margin,
Δ lnp jti
 
the change in the product extensive margin, Δ lndjti
 
the
change in density and Δ lnujti
 
the change in the average value
exported/imported per active country-product pair, which is the
intensive margin.
5.1. Extensive and intensive margin for exports
I found in Section 4.2 that ﬁrms with a higher credit score are also
likely to display higher values of total exports, to be exporting more
products, serving more destinations and to have larger average exports
per non-zero product-country. This result also applies to the growth in
total exports and its components, except for the intensive margin. In
this section, I run the same speciﬁcation as in Eq. (5), but taking as
dependent variables the various elements of Eq. (6). I include ﬁrm
ﬁxed effects, sector-year dummies and control for ﬁrm characteristics
in an OLS speciﬁcation as above. Levels of the dependent variable in
the previous year are included as explanatory variable in each case, to
capture together with the ﬁrm's age the existing exporting activity
level effects on eachmargin, although the results are robust to excludingthem from the regression. The ﬁrst column of Table 7 shows that the in-
crease in total exports relative to the previous year is positively related
to creditworthiness. One standard deviation increase in the logarithmof
the score can be associated with a 2.5% increase in the growth of ex-
ports. This can be decomposed into a positive relation with the increase
in the number of destinations served as shown in column (2) and the in-
crease in the number of products (column (3)). It conﬁrms that credit
constraints can be associated with the ﬁxed costs of exporting to more
countries or more products. Variations in the intensive margin of
trade, the dependent variable of column (5), are not correlated with
credit constraints.
The coefﬁcients on productivity are not signiﬁcantwhen considering
the product and destination extensive margins suggesting that when
looking at changes over time, it is important to also consider other de-
terminants of trading patterns. Besides, being part of a multinational is
positively associated to the increase in the number of destinations and
products exported but not the intensive margin. Finally, the export
levels, whether in value, products or destinations in t-1 are correlated
to the total growth as well as to all three margins negatively: ﬁrms are
less likely to grow in all dimensions if they are already strong exporters.
5.2. Extensive and intensive margin for imports
Identical speciﬁcations are run for imports. There is a strong statisti-
cal relationship between the growth of imports and the Coface score at
t-1: an increase of one standard deviation in the logarithmof the score is
associated with a 2.6% increase in the growth of imports, a ﬁgure very
Table 7
Extensive and intensive margins.
Exports Imports
Dependent
variable
Growth Destination
extensive
margin
Product
extensive
margin
Density Intensive Growth Origen
extensive
margin
Product
extensive
margin
Density Intensive
margin
Δ In (total
value of
exports)
Δ In (number
of destinations)
Δ In (number
of products)
Δ In (active
prod.-dest.
per total
potential)
Δ In (mean
value per active
prod.-dest.)
Δ In (total
value of
imports)
Δ In
(number
of origins)
Δ In (number
of products)
Δ In (active
prod.-orig. per
total potential)
Δ In (mean
value per active
prod.-orig.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Score 0.059** 0.028** 0.029* −0.020* 0.020 0.062*** 0.014 0.035** −0.014 0.023
ln(Score (t-1)) (0.026) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.020) (0.023) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.017)
Productivity 0.115*** 0.016 0.010 −0.005 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.010 0.013 −0.022*** 0.031**
ln(TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) (0.030) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016)
Operational prof. 0.061** 0.027** 0.044*** −0.026** 0.012 0.142*** 0.039*** 0.070*** −0.023*** 0.077***
ln(EBITDA (t-1)) (0.029) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.022) (0.025) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.020)
Wage −0.106** −0.019 0.010 0.037* −0.033 −0.072* 0.008 −0.021 0.014 −0.032
ln(Wage (t-1)) (0.049) (0.021) (0.029) (0.019) (0.034) (0.042) (0.017) (0.024) (0.015) (0.032)
Age −0.144** −0.011 −0.067* 0.064*** −0.007 −0.155*** −0.051** −0.105*** 0.074*** 0.000
ln(Age) (0.061) (0.031) (0.036) (0.022) (0.042) (0.052) (0.024) (0.033) (0.019) (0.036)
Foreign 0.076 0.053** 0.076*** 0.004 0.041 0.025 0.020 0.027 −0.009 0.010
Dummy for MNE(t-1) (0.051) (0.022) (0.028) (0.016) (0.033) (0.036) (0.013) (0.021) (0.011) (0.027)
Total value at t-1 −0.609*** 0.066*** −0.421*** −0.701*** 0.097*** −0.465***
ln(imp./exp. (t-1)) (0.019) (0.005) (0.014) (0.020) (0.006) (0.014)
Countries at t-1 −0.669*** −0.760***
ln(# of dest./orig.(t-1)) (0.014) (0.013)
Products at t-1 −0.713*** −0.685***
ln(# products (t-1)) (0.013) (0.014)
Employment 0.264*** 0.148*** 0.201*** −0.036** 0.182*** 0.298*** 0.151*** 0.219*** −0.040*** 0.208***
ln(employment (t-1)) (0.042) (0.020) (0.026) (0.015) (0.029) (0.040) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) (0.028)
Investment ratio 0.021** 0.008** 0.021*** −0.007*** 0.006 −0.002 0.000 0.001 −0.001** −0.003***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Borrowings cov. −0.021 −0.000 −0.009 −0.003 −0.023 0.001 0.003 −0.016 0.001 0.000
(0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
Financial indep. −0.166** −0.058* −0.149*** 0.058** −0.103* −0.170*** −0.041 −0.028 0.018 −0.114**
(0.082) (0.034) (0.041) (0.026) (0.060) (0.063) (0.027) (0.041) (0.023) (0.045)
Observations 29,000 29,000 29,000 29,000 29,000 31,545 31,545 31,545 31,545 31,545
Number of ﬁrms 5584 5584 5584 5584 5584 5970 5970 5970 5970 5970
R-squared 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.16 0.39 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.16 0.39
Firm ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year ﬁxed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See notes to Table 4. Firm ﬁxed effect regressions (“Within” estimator). Robust standard errors in parentheses; Stars denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***)
level. Includes constant, not reported. Only observations in which the ﬁrm is exporting (columns 1–5) or importing (columns 6–10) are kept. Δ indicates the value of a variable at time t
minus its value at time t-1.
Based on ImportsExportsDynamic_JIErev2_withcontr.
342 M. Muûls / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 333–343similar as that for exports. However, in contrast with the results for
exports when decomposing into different margins, credit worthiness
appears to be strongly signiﬁcantly correlated with the imported
product extensive margin but not with the growth in the number of
countries imported from, as shown in columns (7) and (8) of Table 7.
This suggests that liquidity is not correlated with importing from
more origins, but is positively so with expanding the range of imported
inputs. As discussed above, this correlation suggests the presence of
sunk costs of importing an additional product from abroad. In addition,
it could also be related to the default risk reﬂected in the score: foreign
companies will be less willing to take this risk if the importer has a
lower credit rating. As in the case of exports, changes in average import
values per active product-country are uncorrelated with credit
constraints. The coefﬁcients on operational proﬁtability are positive
and signiﬁcant across all import margins, including the intensive one.
It is also noteworthy that MNE status is not correlated with import
margins.
The results in Table 7 reinforce the ﬁndings from Section 4.2 that
considered the levels of the trade margins. The lack of association be-
tween number of countries imported from and credit constraints
could reﬂect the fact that contrary to exports where more destinations
imply larger markets, the primary rationale for imports is the necessity
to source inputs that are either not available domestically, or not at the
same levels of price or quality. The novel ﬁnding is that at the ﬁrm level,the relationship between credit constraints and the country extensive
margin is different for imports and exports.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I show that credit constraints are related to export and
import volumes and patterns. A precise and complete dataset on trade
transactions at the ﬁrm level for the Belgian manufacturing sector is
combined to a unique and very useful yearly measure of credit con-
straints faced by ﬁrms, a creditworthiness score constructed indepen-
dently by a credit insurance company. These allow me to examine the
relationship between credit constraints and trade in a new way. My
main contribution is to show that credit constraints are important
across the spectrum, not only in cases of payment defaults and that
they are correlated differently with export and import margins.
It is shown that ﬁrms which are less credit-constrained, more pro-
ductive and proﬁtable have a higher probability of being exporters or
importers. Such ﬁrms are also likely to report larger total trade values.
While credit constraints are positively associated with both the country
and product extensivemargins and the intensivemargin of exports, this
is not true in the case of imports where it is only the case for the product
extensive margin of imports.
Finally, this result also holds when decomposing the growth of ex-
ports and imports. I ﬁnd that the growth in the number of products
343M. Muûls / Journal of International Economics 95 (2015) 333–343exported and destinations served is positively correlated with the
Coface score measure. This supports the hypothesis that entering a
newmarket or exporting a new product imply ﬁxed costs for exporters.
On the other hand, for imports, a rise in its credit score is associatedwith
an increase in the number of inputs imported by a ﬁrm. This might re-
ﬂect the impact of theﬁrm'sﬁnancial situation on both aﬁrm's potential
to pay theﬁxed cost of sourcing an additional input from abroad, as well
as the willingness of its potential suppliers to take the risk it might de-
fault. Related to the fact that a ﬁrm rarely imports a good frommultiple
countries, I ﬁnd that a decrease in credit constraints is not positively as-
sociated with an increase in the number of countries that a ﬁrm sources
its imports from.
These results conﬁrm the link between credit constraints and export
and import margins. They also highlight the potential role of govern-
ment agencies in reducing the ﬁxed costs of entry to new markets or
of importing new inputs. Exploring further the relationship between
ﬁnancial constraints and trading behavior, by using ﬁrm level informa-
tion on speciﬁc products' domestic sales versus exports, could shed fur-
ther light on the links between the dynamics of trade and ﬁnancial
constraints.
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